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Abstract— The aviation community is in the process of de-
signing the next generation Aeronautical Telecommunications
Network (ATN), based on Internet standards, to provide air-
ground communications for the aircraft. Support for mobile
networks in the current Internet architecture is provided by
the NEtwork Mobility (NEMO) protocol. As currently defined,
NEMO Basic Support protocol lacks of Route Optimization
support which is an essential requirement for its adoption as
part of the next generation ATN. This paper presents a novel
security tool, the Crypto Prefixes, and their application to the
Route Optimization in Nemo (CRYPTRON). The Crypto Prefixes
are IPv6 prefixes with embedded cryptographic information that
enable the Mobile Network Prefix proof-of ownership without
any centralized trust infrastructure. In CRYPTRON, the Crypto
Prefixes are used to protect the establishment of the bindings on
the Correspondent Nodes for the whole Mobile Network Prefix.
I. INTRODUCTION
The aviation community is on the process of defining
the next generation of the Aeronautical Telecommunications
Network (ATN). The ATN is the network used to provide
air-ground and ground-ground communication services for the
aviation. While the current ATN is based on a modified version
of the Inter-Domain Routing Protocol and the ISO CLNP
protocol for the support of aircraft mobility [1], the next
generation ATN will be based in IETF protocols. In partic-
ular, the International Civil Aviation Organization (ICAO) is
proposing the use of IPv6 for data communications and Mobile
IPv6 (MIPv6) [2] to support aircraft mobility [3]. MIPv6
supports network mobility through the NEMO extensions [4].
However, the current NEMO specification lacks some features
required for the aviation scenario. In particular, as opposed to
MIPv6, NEMO lacks of route optimization (RO) support to
enable direct communication between the nodes in the mobile
network and their communicating peers located in the fixed
infrastructure. The Internet community has acknowledged the
problem and the work on solutions has been chartered in the
Mobility EXTensions working group (MEXT)1 in the Internet
Engineering Task force (IETF).
The objective of this paper is twofold, first we propose a novel
security tool, the Crypto Prefixes. And second we present a
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Route Optimization solution based on Crypto Prefixes which
is especially well suited for the aeronautical requirements.
Crypto Prefixes are IPv6 prefixes that contain embedded
cryptographic information, namely, a hash of a public key.
The Crypto Prefix has notable properties that are suitable
for securing the route optimization procedure. The basic idea
is that thanks to their cryptographic nature, it is possible to
prove the prefix ownership without requiring additional infras-
tructure. By using the Crypto Prefixes, the proposed NEMO
extensions can securely establish a direct route between the
mobile network and the communicating peers located in the
fixed infrastructure.
The paper is structured as follows. Some background about
the NEMO protocol is presented in Section II. Section III
provides an overview of the proposed mechanism, which is
explained in more detail in Sections III-A (Crypto Prefixes)
and III-C (CRYPTRON Operation). Section IV evaluates our
solution against the NEMO RO requirements. In Section V,
we explore alternatives for NEMO RO and compare them to
our approach. Finally, Section VI concludes the paper.
II. NETWORK MOBILITY (NEMO) PROTOCOL OVERVIEW
The Network Mobility protocol as defined in [4] has been
designed to provide support for moving networks in the
Internet. It is a general tool that is well fitted for most common
scenarios. It has been defined as an extension to Mobile IP
[2] in order to perform bindings between prefixes assigned
to the mobile network (called Mobile Network Prefixes) and
the current location of the Mobile Router (MR) that provides
access to the mobile network. In the general NEMO scenario,
Mobile Network Nodes (MNN) configure an address from the
Mobile Network Prefix, obtaining Internet connectivity from
the MR. The Mobile Network Prefix is part of the Home
Network Prefix, which is announced to the Internet through the
ISP of the Home Network. This means that packets addressed
to the mobile network will be routed to the Home Network.
In the case that the mobile network is roaming, the MR will
inform the HA about its current location by means of the
Binding Update (BU) message which contains the Care-off
Address i.e. the topologically correct address obtained by the
MR in its current location. Upon the reception of the BU
message, the HA will create a binding for the Mobile Network
Prefix and the CoA. From then on the HA will forward packets
addressed to the mobile network to the current MR’s CoA.
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Fig. 1. CGPA: Cryptographically Generated Prefix Address
III. CRYPTRON: CRYPTOGRAPHIC PREFIXES FOR
ROUTE OPTIMIZATION IN NEMO
In this paper we propose a novel security tool, the Crypto
Prefixes and its application to NEMO Route Optimization. The
Cryptographic Prefix (Crypto prefix) is a security tool that
enables to prove the ownership of the prefix. The Crypto Prefix
binds a public component of a public-private key pair to IPv6
network prefix. The binding is created by embedding the hash
information of a public key in the prefix itself. The Crypto
Prefix then allows the private key holder to claim the prefix
ownership by proving its knowledge of the corresponding
private key. The ability of the Crypto Prefixes to provide proof-
of ownership of a prefix makes them specially suited for secur-
ing the communication between CNs and MNNs in network
mobility scenario. Hence, in this paper, we also present the
application of the Crypto Prefixes to the Route Optimization
problem in NEMO. CRYPTRON (CRYptographic Prefixes for
Route Optimization in NEMO) is a new approach to provide
route optimization for mobile networks. The main innovation
of CRYPTRON is that it provides high-level security for the
route optimization operations without requiring any infrastruc-
ture, this makes CRYPTRON specially suited for aeronautical
applications. In the following sections we present the Crypto
Prefix tool along with its security analysis. Afterwards the
CRYPTRON solution is described in detail.
A. Crypto Prefixes
Crypto Prefixes are IPv6 prefixes containing embedded
cryptographic information. They are 104 bits long prefixes and
their format is depicted in figure 1. The PKHash parameter is
generated as the output of a one-way hash function computed
over the set of parameters called the Crypto Prefix Parameters.
The Crypto Prefix Parameters are defined as the concatenation
of the public key (Km) and the random value:
Crypto Prefix parameters:Km|RV
The 72-bit long PKHash is then generated as:
PKHash = H(Crypto Prefix parameters)
Crypto Prefixes consist of a routable portion (the Global Prefix
and Subnet ID) and the PKHash. The routable portion is topo-
logically significant, hierarchically-structured and aggregatable
part of the address. The Subnet ID is 13-bits long allowing for
each mobile network that is configured with a Crypto Prefix
to have 213 (8192) subnetworks. This is in the same order
than current address allocation policies that assign a /48 per
end-site supporting 216 subnetworks per site. Contrary to the
routable portion, PKHash is topologically insignificant, it acts
as a network identifier, and thus recedes route aggregation,
but at the same time, it provides a possibility to prove prefix
ownership as described in section III-C. End host addresses
containing the Crypto Prefix are formed by concatenating the
Crypto Prefix and a 24 bit long interface identifier (figure 1).
The interface identifier is chosen randomly and unique within
each subnetwork of the Crypto Prefix. We will denote the
IPv6 address built in the way described in this section as
Cryptographically Generated Prefix Address (CGPA).
B. Security analysis for the Crypto Prefixes
This section is devoted to the security analysis of the Crypto
Prefixes. We assess the security robustness of the Crypto
Prefixes by analyzing the impact of the birthday, brute-force
and pre-computed dictionary attacks on Crypto Prefixes. We
also prove the trustworthiness of our authentication mechanism
by applying BAN logic, which can be found in the appendix.
Regarding the birthday attack, one must define the probability
that two random selections result in the same hash value. In
our case, we define the probability that two different users
generate the same hash value from two different public keys.
In order to quantify the probability, we take into account the
birthday paradox [5]. In order to assess the suitability of the
selected hash length for statistical uniqueness, we contrast
the selected hash length with the number of expected mobile
networks that will use Crypto Prefixes. However, since it is
very hard to predict the actual number of mobile networks
some years ahead, we will take a very conservative approach
and compare it to a very clear upper bound. In particular
we consider a scenario where every node obtains a Crypto
Prefix and evaluates the collision probability. If all nodes in
the current Internet (6 ∗ 108 hosts according to ISC Internet
Domain Survey data about current number of hosts2) obtained
a Crypto Prefix, the collision probability for 72-bit hash will
be p = 3, 81 ∗ 10−05. This probability is in the same order
of magnitude as the probability of the core melt for a modern
nuclear reactor (p = 1 ∗ 10−05 according to [6]).
Either to perform the brute-force attack or the pre-computed
attack, an attacker needs more then 30 years to attack the 72-
bit hash value. The successful brute-force attack on Crypto
Prefix requires O(272) calculations of the PKHash. In each
iteration an attacker hashes 144 bytes (the 1024-bit public
key and the 128-bit random value). According to openssl
speed, a computer with a Pentium(R) III CPU family
(1266MHz) processor and 1GB of RAM hashes 25177 kB
per second, when doing SHA1 for 3s on 64B size blocks. In
order to perform brute-force attack, an attacker would spend
more then 8 ∗ 108 years hashing all the possible inputs.
In the pre-computed dictionary attack, an attacker pre-
computes a list of dictionary words, in our case Crypto
Prefixes. The preparation requires a considerable amount of the
preparation time, but accelerates the actual attack. However,
the storage requirements for all the pre-computed values are
incredibly high. Taking into account that the PKHash is 72
bits long, and the length of the rest of the Crypto Prefix is
32 bits, the dictionary would consist of 272 * 232 entries, i.e.
2https://www.isc.org/solutions/survey
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2.45∗1023 GB. In case of the 1 GB SDRAM memory modules
(6.2 cm x 2.3 cm x 0.2 cm) an attacker needs 7 ∗ 1017m3, or
7.13 ∗ 109 Empire State Buildings (260000 m2 x 381 m) to
store all the memory modules.
C. CRYPTRON Operation
In this section we present the process of securing NEMO
Route Optimization with Crypto Prefixes in detail, starting
from the initialization of the Mobile Network, the movement to
a foreign link, the secured Binding Update sent from a foreign
link, the verification performed by the Correspondent Node
(CN) and the handover in case of the subsequent movements.
During the initialization process, a /19 prefix is assigned
to the Home Network. For each Mobile Network, a /104
mobile prefix is generated, following the procedure described
in section III-A. The Crypto Prefix is assigned to the Mobile
Network and the Mobile Router is provisioned with the Private
Key and Crypto Parameters associated to the Crypto Prefix
assigned to that mobile network. Mobile Network Nodes
obtain their permanent addresses from the Crypto Prefix so all
the mobility procedures are transparent to them. In addition,
the Mobile Router configures its Home Address (MR HoA).
When the mobile network moves away from home, the Mobile
Router obtains a new, topologically correct Care-of address,
MR CoA. The Mobile Router informs the HA about its new
Care-of Address (MR CoA) in the Binding Update message.
As a consequent of the Binding Update message, the Mobile
Router and the Home Agent set up the IP-in-IP tunnel between
them, secured with IPsec. After that, the communications
initiated by the Mobile Network Node with a Correspondent
Node flow through the Mobile Router and the Home Agent to
the Correspondent Node.
Since the routing in the case of a communication between the
Mobile Network Node and the Correspondent Node through
the Home Agent is suboptimal, the Mobile Router decides at
some point to trigger the Route Optimization procedure, i.e.
to send packets directly to CN. Thus, it sends the Binding Up-
date message, containing the Mobile Network Prefix and the
MR CoA, secured by the Crypto Prefix to the Correspondent
Node (figure 2).
The Binding Update message is secured with the Crypto Prefix
mechanism by introducing two new options for the Binding
Update message:
• Crypto Prefix Signature (CPS) option: it is used to carry
a signature computed over the Mobile Router’s Care-
of Address (AM ), Correspondent Node’s address (AC)
and the Mobility Header (MH) in the Binding Update
message using the private key associated to the Crypto
Prefix (K−1m ):
CPS option = H(AM , ACN ,MH,RV )K−1m
• Crypto Prefix Parameters (CPP) option: which contains
the public key (Km) corresponding to the PKHash and
the random value RV used to compute the PKHash:
CPP option = Km|RV
Fig. 2. NEMO Route Optimization with Crypto Prefix protected Binding
Update message
This yields the CRYPTRON message:
MR → CN : AM , ACN ,MH,RV,H(AM , ACN ,MH,RV )K−1m
These options allow securing the BU messages from the MR
to the CN. The basic idea is that the MR will convey the
following three elements to the receiver along with the BU: i)
the Crypto Prefix, ii) the associated Crypto Prefix Parameters
and iii) a Crypto Prefix Signature. The receiver validates the
BU performing a set of verifications; First, it computes the
hash of the public key and random value contained in the CPP
option and compares it to the Crypto Prefix in the received
Binding Update message. Second, after the verification of the
Crypto Prefix, the verifier checks the signature in the Crypto
Prefix Signature option. For that, it computes the cryptographic
hash over the Mobile Router’s Care-of Address, its own
address and the mobility header, and verifies the signature of
the hash using the public key KM received in the CPP option.
In case of the successful verification, the sender proves that it
is the owner of the Crypto Prefix.
The trust chain is then as follows: The Crypto Prefix is bound
to the public key (KM ) through the hash (PKHash). The
public key is inherently bound to the private key (K−1m ). The
private key is bound to the Signature option, since only the
private key holder can generate it. Then there is a trust chain
between the holder of the private key and the Crypto Prefix,
hence the receiver can validate that the sender is the owner
of the prefix. A formal derivation, using BAN logic, of the
CRYPTRON trust chain can be found in the appendix.
After the Correspondent Node verifies the BU message, it
creates the binding for the Mobile Network Prefix and replies
to the Mobile Router with the Binding Acknowledgement
(BA) message. After reception of the BA, the Mobile Router
is ready to send data packets directly to the Correspondent
Node through the optimized path. Data packets from the
Mobile Network Node, are sent through the Mobile Router to
the Correspondent Node. They contain the HoA Destination
option defined by MIPv6 carrying the MR-HoA. Upon the
reception of the packets by the CN, it replaces the source
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address from the packet (MR CoA) with the Mobile Router’s
Home Address (MR HoA), since the upper layer protocols
are aware only of the Mobile Router’s Home Address. In
the opposite direction, when the Correspondent Node sends
a packet to the Mobile Network Node, it adds the MR HoA
address into the routing header, hiding the use of topologically
correct MR CoA from the upper layers.
IV. EVALUATION
In order to evaluate our proposal, we will contrast CRYP-
TRON against the requirements defined by the aviation com-
munity for the NEMO route optimization support for the next
generation ATN. The requirements of a Route Optimization
(RO) solution for NEMO, as specified in [7] [8], are the
following:
• Flow separability; The local policy must be able to
decide which traffic flows through the optimized path and
which traffic flows through the HA path, providing flow
granularity for optimization decision. CRYPTRON can
easily satisfy the separability requirement for different
traffic flows by adding the local policy database within
the Mobile Router.
• Multihoming; A Route Optimization solution must sup-
port a multi-interfaced MR and must allow a domain to
be bound to a specific interface. CRYPTRON satisfies
the multihoming requirement since it is possible to apply
it to the multi-interfaced Mobile Routers with bindings
of its different MR CoA addresses to the Crypto Mobile
Network Prefix.
• Latency and Availability; This requirement imposes that
the Route Optimization solution must not add any extra
delay in the transfer of data, hence the MR must be
able to keep on using the non-optimized path while it
is setting up the optimized one. As described in section
III-C, CRYPTRON supports the NEMO Basic Support
protocol and allows for the use of the tunnel between
the Mobile Router and the Home Agent (MRHA tunnel)
in the process of Home Network initialization, or re-
configuration, hence supporting the latency requirement.
Additionally, our solution supports the Mobile Router to
fall-back to the MRHA tunnel in case of any failure, and
thus satisfies the availability requirement as defined in the
requirements document.
• Packet Loss; The use of a Route Optimization solution
should not incur in a higher loss or duplication of data
than the use of the NEMO basic support. CRYPTRON
prevents from the additional packet loss caused by the
Route Optimization mechanism. The Binding Update
message has to be followed by the Binding Acknowl-
edgment, and if that is not the case, the Mobile Router
continues to use the MRHA tunnel, so no packets are lost
during the setting of the optimized path.
• Scalability and Efficient Signaling; The Route Optimiza-
tion solution must be able to scale to hundreds of
thousands mobile nodes without overloading the ground
network, it must also be efficient in the signaling part,
in terms of number of packets and their size. CRYP-
TRON solution is also in accordance with the scalability
requirement and efficient signaling requirements, since
one of its goals is to reduce the signaling overhead to
only one round trip (the Binding Update message and
the Binding Acknowledgment message) and the signaling
message size by the use of the Crypto Prefix tool. In
particular, each BU message will create a binding for
the whole prefix of the mobile network, resulting in effi-
cient signaling. In addition, CRYPTRON, has no impact
whatsoever in the global routing system (i.e. no routes
are injected though BGP as the result from movement).
Thus, our solution minimizes the overload of the ground
network and the routing system.
• Security and Adaptability; Because of the cryptographic
nature of Crypto Mobile Network Prefixes, the CRYP-
TRON solution automatically supports the security re-
quirements, e.g. the proof of ownership of the MR CoA
address. Additionally, CRYPTRON satisfies the security
requirement in the optimized way, since with the Crypto
Prefix tool protects the whole mobile network, and not
just a particular Mobile Network Node. In addition,
CRYPTRON is transparent to the upper layer protocols,
providing the possibility to use new transport protocols
(IPsec or new IP options within it) and thus satisfies the
adaptability requirement.
The Crypto Prefix also satisfies additional desirable charac-
teristics defined by the aviation community for NEMO Route
Optimization solutions: i) CRYPTRON allows the protection
of the binding establishment without increasing the config-
uration complexity on Correspondent Nodes and ii) it does
not require any trust infrastructure and process of prefix
proof-of ownership is self-adjusting from the Correspondent
Node’s point of view. Similarly, since the Mobile Router
provides NEMO Route Optimization feature on behalf of the
Mobile Network Nodes, our solution does not increase the
configuration complexity of the Mobile Network Nodes.
At the end, CRYPTRON is a general solution for securing the
binding establishment between the Mobile Router’s Care-of
Address and Mobile Network on each Correspondent Node,
and can be applied to any other context, outside of aeronautics
and space exploration.
V. COMPARISON WITH OTHER PROPOSALS
With the current NEMO Basic Support, all the communi-
cation between the Mobile Network and the CN goes through
the bidirectional tunnel between the MR and the HA. When
the Mobile Network is not at home, this result in sub-optimal
routing, increased packet delay, congestion in the Home Net-
work and increased packet overhead in the MRHA tunnel. In
order to solve these problems, different partial NEMO RO
solutions were offered, with focus on different problems. In
the following lines we present the advantages of CRYPTRON
over the most relevant RO proposals being developed at the
moment:
• CRYPTRON is more efficient in terms of number of
signaling messages and handover delay than solutions
based on extending the Return Routability Procedure of
MIPv6 such as [9] and [10]. Since the Mobile Network is
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self-authenticated through the Crypto Prefix mechanism,
CRYPTRON avoids the need for the Home Address
Test, as a protection from the hijacking attacks, and
thus reduces the number of signaling messages and the
handover delay.
• CRYPTRON is more efficient in terms of packet overhead
than solutions which use extra-tunnels to provide routing
between the CN and MNN such as the NEMO Basic
protocol and RO proposals [11] and [12].
• By proving the possession of the private key, the MR us-
ing CRYPTRON is automatically delegated for signaling
right to authenticate BUs, which solves both the identity
attacks and location attacks, contrary to [10].
• Contrary to our proposal, some NEMO RO mechanisms
are based on the prefix delegation [13] [14] and increase
the complexity of other protocols (e.g. Neighbor Discov-
ery) or other network elements (e.g. the access router).
• The suggested proposal does not require any central-
ized trust infrastructure (PKI), contrary to other propos-
als [15].
VI. CONCLUSION
This paper proposes a novel security tool, the Crypto
Prefixes. Crypto Prefixes are 104-bit IPv6 prefixes which
consist of the routable portion and a cryptographic portion,
allowing the proof-of ownership of a given prefix. This paper
also presents the application of the Crypto Prefix to the Route
Optimization problem in mobile networks (CRYPTRON). The
cryptographic nature of the Crypto Prefix allows the prefix
proof-of ownership to the whole mobile network, in the way
transparent to the Mobile Network Nodes. CRYPTRON is a
scalable solution, since it ensures the required trust between
the Correspondent Node and the whole mobile network, and it
does not depend on other infrastructures, since the process of
the secure binding establishment does not require any central-
ized trust infrastructure. It also reduces the handover latency
by avoiding the need for the part of the Return Routability
procedure - Home Address Test. We have contrasted the
proposed solution to the requirements defined by the aviation
community for the support of network mobility in the next
generation ATN and we have verified that CRYPTRON is
perfectly suited for the proposed scenario, providing high level
security and reduced deployment costs.
APPENDIX: BAN ANALYSIS OF CRYPTRON
We will use BAN logic [16] statements over principals CN
(correspondent node), MR (mobile router) and MNN (mobile
network node), and encryption keys Km (MR’s public key)
and K−1m in order to evaluate the proposed authentication
mechanism, CRYPTRON. In the BAN logic, principal starts
with the initial belief in at least one key. In our case, CN
believes that MR owns Km as a public key:
CN |=Km→ MR (Assumption 1)
The next assumption we make is that the random value RV
is fresh, since RV is a nonce and it has not been used at any
time before the current binding update message:
CN |= #(RV ) (Assumption 2)
The goal of the CRYPTRON is to ensure the statement
”CN believes MR believes AM to be MR’s Care-of Address
with associated mobile network prefix stored in the mobil-
ity header (MH)”. Besides, CRYPTRON ensures that ”CN
believes MNN” based on MR’s jurisdiction over the mobile
network:
CN |=MR |= AM ,MH and CN |=MNN (Goal)
The CRYPTRON message:
MR → CN : AM , ACN ,MH,RV, {H(AM , ACN ,MH,RV )}K−1m
Together with the message-meaning rule, the nonce-
verification rule and the jurisdiction rule this yields:
CN  H(AM , ACN ,MH,RV )
CN |= MR |∼ H(AM , ACN ,MH,RV )
CN |= MR |= (AM , ACN ,MH,RV ), i.e. CN |= AM ,MH
CN |= MR |=> MNN,CN |= MR |= MNN, i.e. CN |= MNN
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